Volume 4 Issue 3
By Aaran Thakore, Hampton School
Citation
Thakore, A. 2025. Uyghurs in China: the application of the UN’s 1948 Genocide Convention in the contemporary world. Routes, 4(3): 159-168.
Abstract
This article will look at the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, Northwest China examining the Chinese state’s actions in response to what it regards as a growing Islamic threat. Exploring Xinjiang’s specific geopolitical importance within China’s wider economic position it will examine the reasons that may suggest that the mistreatment of the Uyghur minority would be in Chinese interest, with the aim to ascertain whether the actions of Chinese authorities constitute genocide, and thereby require changes in international intergovernmental policies.
1. Introduction
Muslims account for 1.8%, around 22 million, of China’s population (UK Home Office, 2022). From this number, Uyghurs are a predominantly Muslim ethnic minority, with around 12 million living within the official Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (BBC, 2022). As speakers of the Turkic Uyghur language, Uyghurs often affiliate more with other central Asian countries rather than mainland China. Over recent years, there has been a growing concern within the international community regarding the Chinese government’s treatment of Uyghurs, with the discovery of ‘re-education camps’ (legalized nationally in 2018) (CNN, 2018) and reports of ethnic genocide.
Genocide covers any ‘crime committed with the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, in whole or in part’ (United Nations, 1948). Unfortunately, the recognition of genocide as a crime under international law in 1946 has not stopped genocides occurring. From the 1994 genocide against Rwandan Tutsis to the loss of an estimated 300,000 civilians in Western Sudan during the Darfur genocide in 2003, there have been many human rights atrocities after that date that are widely accepted as genocidal in nature (Holocaust Encyclopaedia, 2023). For the two aforementioned events, the criterion for genocide classification was met through the explicit targeting of a specific group aimed at weakening, if not eradicating, them. However even then, there remains much contention around the recognition of events as genocide and such a declaration too often happens after the event. From the potential Second Rwandan Genocide to the atrocities perpetrated against Tamil individuals in Sri Lanka through much of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, there remains many events in modern history that experts continue to debate as to whether they classify as genocidal or not. However, though the vague definition of genocide does allow room for speculation, if the accounts of Chinese Uyghurs, including victims of ‘vocational education’, are accurate, there is reasonable justification to recognise these acts as genocidal, despite Chinese resistance to this.
2. Evidence of Genocide
This section reviews some of the evidence of genocide in relation to the Uyghurs. In 2016, the Chinese government spontaneously recalled passports for review discriminately targeting Uyghurs (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Those who failed to do so were barred from travelling internationally (Shihezi Public Security Bureau Immigration Office, 2016, cited in Human Rights Watch, 2016), however, this was implemented only within specific areas, uncoincidentally preventing Uyghurs from fleeing discrimination. This breaks Chinese passport law which states ‘No organization or individual may… illegally hold or detain any passport’ (Congressional Executive Commission on China, 2006). Alongside the more rigorous Uyghur passport controls, this supports the notion that China is blocking the Uyghurs’ free travel and violating their personal freedoms.
On September 10th 2017, the Human Rights Watch issued a report that Uyghur Muslims were being illegally detained since April of that year. It stated that while these facilities violated international human rights laws, the Chinese referred to them as ‘counter extremism training centres’. Uyghurs interviewed felt that they were propaganda facilities where Uyghurs were forced ‘to renounce their ethnic and religious identities’. This cultural denunciation could be further evidence of a governmental scheme to eradicate the Uyghur ethnic identity, falling within the UN’s genocide definition.
Furthermore, rape, sexual harassment, torture, and inhumane conditions in ‘re-education’ facilities, have been reported. As shown in the book ‘No Escape’ by Nury Turkel, American lawyer and former Chair of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF, 2023), male and female detainees are often subject to gang rape and sexual abuse, including gross sexual harassment during interrogation, potentially resulting in false confessions (Turkel, 2022: 152). ‘Black rooms’, where torture through common techniques occurs, have also been reported by survivors (Turkel, 2022: 152). Life in these camps is dire, with limited sanitation facilities and many dying from starvation (The Art Newspaper, 2021). These accounts are corroborated by a 2021 BBC report, in which, despite not being completely verified, personal stories have aligned with external records as well as Chinese guard defectors’ accounts. These reports confirm that China’s actions are in violation of the United Nation’s 1990 ‘Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners’.
However, Chinese government’s surveillance of Uyghurs reaches beyond state-controlled facilities. Not only are Uyghurs unable to attain top jobs without changing their name and recognised ethnicity (Turkel, 2022: 104), in 2021 a UK tribunal, accused China of escalating matters further with forced sterilisations aimed at eradicating the Uyghur population. This Uyghur Tribunal, though not formally recognised, concluded that Beijing was guilty of genocide (BMJ, 2021). Such sterilisation has contributed to rapidly falling Uyghur birth rates (AP News, 2020).
Chinese state heads also monitor Uyghurs electronically through the instillation of ‘Clean Internet Security Soldier’ (New York Post, 2022). This digital application tracks an individual’s location and phone activity including private messages, with technology implemented to recognise non-Mandarin words or any deemed ‘Islamic’ in nature (Turkel, 2022: 99). This helps officials punish those who have failed to renounce their identity as a Uyghur Muslim, further evidence of a Chinese agenda to eradicate the Uyghur religious identity. Uyghurs would also be expected to undergo security measures consisting of biometric tests such as facial recognition and body language analysis, so they are identifiable by cameras installed within Uyghur populated areas (Guardian, 2019), an infringement of personal rights aiding the arbitrary arrest and detention of all those that display any religious tendencies, no matter how minor.
In 2016, the Chinese Communist Party, initiated the ‘Becoming Family Campaign’ (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Through this, it is estimated that alongside the million Uyghurs held in camps, an equivalently large number of Chinese ‘family members’ are being forcibly introduced into Uyghur families within Xinjiang to monitor their behaviour and suppress their characteristic identity. These ‘relatives’ test religious observance by ordering Uyghurs to drink alcohol or partake in other activities forbidden under Islamic law (Turkel, 2022: 133). This is not only a breach of privacy and dignity, but also compromised the safety of families, as many ‘relatives’ would rape and harass female members of the household.
Alongside adults, children are also being impacted by the Chinese government as it targets young Uyghurs by isolating them from their families in state run orphanages or schools and forcing them to adopt Mandarin Chinese. There they are, in effect, brainwashed to denounce their identity and ethnic roots through indoctrinating slogans praising the leading Chinese Communist Party (BBC, 2019). According to a study by Adrian Zenz, an expert in the Chinese state’s treatment of Uyghurs, between 2017 and 2019 the number of students enrolled in boarding educational facilities without their families, increased from 5000,000 to 900,000 (Medium, 2020). This supports the notion of a Chinese-led initiative to control Uyghur children, turning them into ‘ideal’ Han Chinese citizens, and thus stopping the Uyghur cultural, religious, and ethnic identity from taking root in the next generation.
3. Reasons for Genocide
For decades, Xinjiang has called for independence, finding itself disconnected from mainland Han China. This resulted in the formation of an independent ‘East Turkestan’ twice in the early-mid 19th century. However, both were short lived and opposed by Chinese authorities, proof of Tim Marshall’s (2015) evaluation in ‘Prisoners of Geography’, that ‘Xinjiang is too strategically important to allow (for) an independence movement’. As Marshall (2015) explains, Xinjiang is of geopolitical importance. Not only does it contain oil resources and forms an integral part of the inland Silk Road trade route, but Xinjiang is also perceived as a geographical barrier separating China’s economic core from its neighbours (Marshall, 2015: 49). Like Tibet, China wants control over the area to reduce any threat from India (ORF, 2021), and this will only be achieved if the Chinese government continues to have regional influence ensuring a physical buffer zone is maintained. As mentioned, this is neither new, nor is it unique to the Xinjiang region. Similar concerns surrounding the possible independence of the Tibet region have seen the Chinese state deliberately destroy Tibetan farmland, and henceforth inducing famines, forcibly sterilising women, and instigating the mass bombing of Tibetan land (World Without Genocide). These practices, beginning as early as 1959, show disturbing resemblance to those carried out in Xinjiang. Marshall (2015) states China is weakening these regions and their respective separatist movements by oppressing the individual cultures driving them to do this, be it through diluting regions with ethnic Han Chinese migrants, a process dubbed as ‘Hanification’ (Wiley Library, 2017) or through the suppression of individual expression.
However, as much as Xinjiang acts a barrier between China and its neighbours, it also connects them. Though it is one of the poorer regions within China, it is home to many important infrastructural programmes. One of these is a proposed railway line between Pakistan and Xinjiang, aimed at further connecting the economies of China and Pakistan at an estimated cost of $58 billion (South China Morning Post, 2023). Additionally, within this wider Chinese aim for regional economic integration, Xinjiang acts as an access point into central Asia, something of integral importance in the scope of China’s ever ambitious ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ launched in 2013 (JK Policy Institute, 2022). Another noteworthy geopolitical and economic importance of the region is its position within Chinese energy production. With over 20% of China’s energy reserves, its concentration of natural gas, coal and other fossil fuels place it in first place for fossil fuel resources in the country. In addition, the area’s wind power and solar energy resources are the second largest, while Xinjiang also has significant hydropower reserves, all of which will be essential in any possible energy transition (POWER, 2016). Coupled with its rich iron, copper, and nickel stores, such a region would not be only beneficial for China to keep up with domestic demand but also help retain its power, importance, and influence as a dominant player within the global economy despite also being, perhaps slightly contradictorily, poor. Therefore, Xinjiang is an essential region to help both separate and integrate China into the rest of the world.
Another possible explanation, as noted by China analyst Ethan Gutmann’s 2016 report, is that the Chinese state could be actively targeting minority groups for organs needed to sustain a lucrative organ trade. This organ harvesting which Gutmann believes includes the murdering innocent civilians could be responsible for up to ten times the number of transplants officially recorded by the Chinese government (Ethan Gutmann, 2016). In 2021 the United Nations Human Rights office corroborated this by issuing a damning report accusing China of allegedly ‘organ harvesting targeting minorities, including Falun Gong practitioners, Uyghurs, Tibetans, Muslims and Christians’ (OHCHR, 2021). This shows the startling governmental exploitation of minority groups for financial gain.
4. China’s Stance
Though Chinese officials recognised mass detentions in 2018 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), China has continued to deny any wrongdoing. In a report titled ‘Fight against Terrorism and Extremism in Xinjiang: Truth and Facts’, issued in response to UN findings in 2022, Chinese authorities insist implemented policies are aimed at ‘de-radicalization’, targeted at ‘fighting terrorism and extremism’ which it goes on to say is a ‘pressing need’ (OHCHR, 2022), confirmed by the absence of terror attacks in Xinjiang since 2016 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022). However, there is little proof that previous attacks were a product of ‘extremist ideologies’ rather than a delayed fruition of long suppressed anger and frustration against discrimination by the Chinese state (BBC, 2015).
The Chinese government also maintains that Uyghurs have had fewer population control measures than Han Chinese citizens and that ‘the population… of ethnic minorities has continued to grow’ (OHCHR, 2022). Despite this, independent reports have shown Xinjiang’s birth rate has fallen by almost 50% between 2017 and 2019 (BBC, 2021), proof of an aim to diminish Uyghur populations, bringing the credibility of China’s official statistics into question. Nevertheless, the 2022 Chinese report claims that all genocide allegations are ‘a farce orchestrated… by Western countries’ (OHCHR, 2022) which, in addition to ‘cultural genocide’ not being recognised under the United Nations’ definition (UN, 1948), has helped China deny the allegations under international legislation. The rigidity of the UN’s genocide definition, alongside the uncertainty that masks the true nature and intent of Chinese actions, has meant that many nations and independent organisations have found difficulty in confirming China’s treatment of Uyghurs as a genocide, even when, from a human suffering standpoint, there is little ambiguity.
5. International Response
In 2020, 39 countries signed a statement recognising China’s mistreatment of Uyghurs whilst a counter statement supporting China received signatories from 45 countries (The Diplomat, 2020). Counterintuitively, Muslim nations have supported Chinese actions (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022), a trend explainable by the global influence and economic benefits that China brings to the region. Though sanctions have been imposed by the UK, US, Canada, and EU, (BBC, 2021) China has retaliated and international responses have been criticised for being too lenient and ineffective (Washington Post, 2021).
Sanctioning China is problematic in such a globalised economy, particularly when up to 90% of Chinese cotton, a major cotton source, is produced in Xinjiang (Swiss Info, 2023). Furthermore, while sanctions can be imposed on Xinjiang products, due to complex trade routes and global agreements it is often difficult to ascertain the true source of all materials. Therefore, despite the 2022 US sanctions causing a 90% decline in American imports from Xinjiang (Foreign Policy, 2023), other countries remain hesitant to follow and there is scepticism as to whether such sanctions can be successfully enforced and can lead to the intended positive change.
6. Conclusion
China continues to deny any mistreatment of Uyghurs. The state media and official government reports portray evidence of a growing Uyghur population striving within a recently stabilized Xinjiang. However, countless international reports suggest otherwise. Through independent research, confirmation of the mass detention, torture, murder and forced indoctrination of ethnic Uyghurs has been uncovered, including a startling reduction in Xinjiang’s Uyghur population. Corroborated by first-hand accounts, China’s denial can only mean one thing, the most incriminating act in a show of deception – these are indeed acts of a genocidal nature, crimes backed by Chinese authorities, aimed at eradicating the Uyghur culture and identity from China and thereby reducing the threat they pose to a growingly authoritarian Chinese state. Claims made by the Chinese government, lack verification and cannot be evaluated to be truly independent from any exterior motive of potential personal gain. Even if cultural genocide is not included within the UN’s definition, a ‘crime with the intent to destroy an ethnic or religious group in whole or in part’ is (UN, 1948). Chinese actions have aimed to do that and more, with similar policies imposed on other groups, like the Uyghurs, that qualify as both ethnic and religious minorities. Unfortunately, in areas such as Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau, similarly repressive schemes are also at play, and though separatism may be a cause for concern for Chinese authorities, their actions, from a human rights’ standpoint, cannot be tolerated.
In conclusion, the accumulative findings of the various reports recognise the actions of China as genocide which merit more severe sanctions. Though perhaps challenging in an ever-globalised economy, one in which China holds 18.92% in global GDP as of April 2023 (International Monetary Fund, 2023), governments should not, whether directly or indirectly, fund or support any institution reliant on the exploitation of individuals and their basic human rights. To prevent this, restrictions must be implemented, room for error eradicated, and a concerted effort carried out to remove all forced labour from supply chains and the production of goods. As a society we must turn to other sustainable alternative supply chains, those unattributed to governments’ genocidal initiatives with do not come at the expense of minorities.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the University of Northampton’s URB@N grant scheme who awarded the funding for this research.
References
2020 Edition: Which Countries Are For or Against China’s Xinjiang Policies? – The Diplomat. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/2020-edition-which-countries-are-for-or-against-chinas-xinjiang-policies/.
Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners | OHCHR. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-treatment-prisoners
China cuts Uighur births with IUDs, abortion, sterilization | AP News. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c.
China: Free Xinjiang ‘Political Education’ Detainees | Human Rights Watch. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/10/china-free-xinjiang-political-education-detainees.
China Muslims: Xinjiang schools used to separate children from families – BBC News. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-48825090.
China: Passports Arbitrarily Recalled in Xinjiang | Human Rights Watch. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/22/china-passports-arbitrarily-recalled-xinjiang.
China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes in Muslim Region | Human Rights Watch. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/14/china-visiting-officials-occupy-homes-muslim-region.
China’s hi-tech war on its Muslim minority | China | The Guardian. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/apr/11/china-hi-tech-war-on-muslim-minority-xinjiang-uighurs-surveillance-face-recognition.
China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang | Council on Foreign Relations. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights.
China’s Xinjiang Policy: The Imperative for India | ORF. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.orfonline.org/research/chinas-xinjiang-policy-the-imperative-for-india/.
Chinese birth-control policy could cut millions of Uyghur births, report finds – BBC News. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-57383548.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of. (n.d.).
Country policy and information note: Muslims (including Uyghurs in Xinjiang), July 2022 (accessible) – GOV.UK. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/china-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-muslims-including-uyghurs-in-xinjiang-july-2022-accessible#Religion_in_China.
Dyer, C. (2021). China forced Muslims in Xinjiang to be sterilised and have abortions, concludes tribunal. BMJ, 375, n3124. https://doi.org/10.1136/BMJ.N3124.
Ethan Gutmann. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://ethan-gutmann.com/.
Evidence – Uyghur Tribunal. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://uyghurtribunal.com/statements/.
Fight against Terrorism and Extremism in Xinjiang: Truth and Facts. (n.d.).
Former Commissioners | USCIRF. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.uscirf.gov/about-uscirf/former-commissioners.
How China Uses High-Tech Surveillance to Subdue Minorities – The New York Times. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/world/asia/china-surveillance-xinjiang.html.
In Xinjiang, China Forces Uyghurs to Pick Cotton. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/16/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-cotton-forced-labor/.
Liu, A. H., & Peters, K. (2017). The Hanification of Xinjiang, China: The Economic Effects of the Great Leap West. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 17(2), 265–280. https://doi.org/10.1111/SENA.12233.
Marshall, T. (2015). Prisoners of Geography – Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need To Know About Global Politics (2016th, 2019th ed.). Elliott and Thompson Limited.
Osborne’s Xinjiang visit: a “political coup” for China? – BBC News. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-34332833.
Parent-Child Separation in Yarkand County, Kashgar | by Adrian Zenz | Medium. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://adrianzenz.medium.com/story-45d07b25bcad.
Passport Law of the People’s Republic of China | Congressional-Executive Commission on China. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/passport-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china.
The complicated path to avoiding cotton from Xinjiang – SWI swissinfo.ch. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/the-complicated-path-to-avoiding-cotton-from-xinjiang/48134540.
The Hanification of Xinjiang, China: The Economic Effects of the Great Leap West – Liu – 2017 – Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism – Wiley Online Library. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/sena.12233.
“Their goal is to destroy everyone”: Uighur camp detainees allege systematic rape – BBC News. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-55794071.
Turkel, N. (2022). No Escape: The True Story of China’s Genocide of the Uyghurs .
Uighurs: Western countries sanction China over rights abuses – BBC News. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-56487162.
Uyghur crisis: Xinjiang “re-education camps” legalized after China denies they exist | CNN. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://edition.cnn.com/2018/10/10/asia/xinjiang-china-reeducation-camps-intl/index.html.
Uyghur tribunal reveals horrific abuses inside Xinjiang detention camps. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2021/06/11/uyghur-tribunal-reveals-horrific-abuses-inside-xinjiang-detention-camps.
Who are the Uyghurs and why is China being accused of genocide? – BBC News. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-22278037.
World Economic Outlook (April 2023) – GDP based on PPP, share of world. (n.d.). Retrieved August 10, 2023, from https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD.
#Write for Routes
Are you 6th form or undergraduate geographer?
Do you have work that you are proud of and want to share?
Submit your work to our expert team of peer reviewers who will help you take it to the next level.
Related articles